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1. 124 S. Ct. 2117 (2004).
2. 540 U.S. 749 (2004).
3. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
The civil cases decided by the United States Supreme Courtduring its last term were headlined by its decisionsreasserting the rule of law in the context of detainees in
the war on terrorism.  In addition, the Court handed down a
number of decisions on civil rights, the First Amendment, fed-
eralism, presidential power, and civil statutory interpretation.
We review those cases here.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
In Nelson v. Campbell,1 a unanimous Court held that 42
U.S.C. section 1983 was the appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s
claim seeking temporary stay and permanent relief from a cut-
down procedure to find a vein for a lethal injection to carry out
a death sentence.  Petitioner was sentenced to death and
informed that, because his veins were compromised from years
of drug-use, prison officials would perform a “cut-down” pro-
cedure prior to the lethal injection to find a vein.  He filed a
section 1983 action claiming the procedure “constituted cruel
and unusual punishment and deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”
The question before the Court was whether petitioner’s claim
was the functional equivalent of a habeas petition and, there-
fore, whether petitioner was required to obtain approval to file
a second or successive habeas petition pursuant to section
2244(b)(3).  Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, deter-
mined that it was not.  A section 1983 claim must give way to
“the more specific habeas statute, with its attendant procedural
and exhaustion requirements, where an inmate seeks injunc-
tive relief challenging the fact of his conviction or the duration
of his sentence.”  However, where the challenge is merely to
the “conditions of a prisoner’s confinement,” the claim can be
made under section 1983 in the first instance.  The Court rec-
ognized that the challenge to a particular method of execution
did not necessarily call into question the fact or validity of a
sentence, however, “imposition of the death penalty presup-
poses a means of carrying it out.”  Nonetheless, a prisoner who
was not facing a death sentence could bring a section 1983
action to challenge the cut-down procedure.  The fact that the
state can make a connection between the cut-down procedure
and execution did not change this: “[t]hat venous access is a
necessary prerequisite does not imply that a particular means
of gaining such access is likewise necessary.”  If the cut-down
method was mandatory by law, or petitioner was unable or
unwilling “to concede acceptable alternatives,” the state’s argu-
ment might have had more weight.  However, such was not the
case.
In a per curiam decision, the Court, in Muhammad v. Close,2
held that where a prisoner’s 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim can-
not be considered on habeas relief based on any recognized
theory, the prisoner need not exhaust state or federal remedies
before filing an action in federal court.  Petitioner, a prisoner,
was put into detention until his hearing for violation of a
prison rule prohibiting “threatening behavior.”  At the hearing,
he was acquitted of threatening behavior but charged with the
lesser infraction of insolence, for which prehearing detention
was not required.  Petitioner served an additional seven days of
detention and was deprived of privileges for 30 days.
Petitioner filed a complaint under section 1983 for damages.
The Sixth Circuit dismissed the action pursuant to Heck v.
Humphrey,3 stating “that an action under  1983 to expunge his
misconduct charge and for other relief occasioned by miscon-
duct proceedings could be brought only after satisfying Heck’s
favorable termination requirement.”  
In its decision, the Court first noted that the Sixth Circuit
mistakenly assumed that petitioner was seeking expungement of
the misconduct from his prison charge; he was not.  It then went
on to discuss whether Heck’s favorable termination requirement
applied.  As background, the Court stated: “Federal law opens
two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprison-
ment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.  2254, and a com-
plaint under . . . § 1983.”  Challenges on the “validity of con-
finement or to the particulars affecting its duration are the
province of habeas corpus,” while “requests for relief turning on
circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983
action.”  Federal petitions for habeas corpus “may be granted
only after other avenues of relief have been exhausted.”
However, “[p]risoners suing under § 1983 . . . generally face a
substantially lower gate, even with the requirement of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 that administrative opportunities
be exhausted first.” The Court then discussed hybrid cases,
where a prisoner seeks “relief unavailable in habeas” but the
allegations “imply the invalidity either of an underlying convic-
tion or of a particular ground for denying release short of serv-
ing the maximum term of confinement.”   The Court’s decision
in Heck addressed these hybrid cases, holding “that where suc-
cess in a prisoner’s § 1983 damages action would implicitly
question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the
litigant must first achieve favorable state, or federal habeas,
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opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sen-
tence.”  The Court, however, concluded that the Sixth Circuit
erred “by following the mistaken view expressed in circuit
precedent that Heck applie[d] categorically to all suits challeng-
ing prison disciplinary proceedings.”  The Court recognized
these administrative proceedings “do not as such raise any
implication about the validity of the underlying conviction, and
although they may affect the duration of time to be served (by
bearing on the award or revocation of good-time credits) that is
not necessarily so.”  In this case, Muhammad “raised no claim
on which habeas relief could have been granted on any recog-
nized theory, with the consequence that Heck’s favorable termi-
nation requirement was inapplicable.”
Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court in Jones v.
R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,4 held that claims arising under 42
U.S.C. section 1981, as amended by the 1991 Act, are governed
by the four-year statute of limitations for actions arising under
federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990, 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1658.  Petitioners, former employees of respondent,
brought a class action for violation of their rights under section
1981.  Their claims existed solely because of Congress’s amend-
ment to section 1981 in the 1991 Act.  The employer moved to
dismiss the action, arguing the applicable state statute of limi-
tations had lapsed.  Petitioners, the former employees,
responded by arguing that the four-year statute of limitations
under section 1658 applied.   Section 1658 provides a four-year
statute of limitations for actions arising under federal statutes
enacted after December 1, 1990.  Because the Court found the
term “arising under” vague, it turned to the history of the enact-
ment of section 1658 to determine Congress’s intent.  Before its
enactment, there was no uniform federal statute of limitations
period and federal courts borrowed limitation periods from
states.  This void created a host of problems, which Congress
attempted to alleviate by adopting a uniform limitations period.
The Court concluded “[t]hat the history . . . [of] the enactment
of  1658 strongly supports an interpretation that fills more
rather than less of the void that has created so much unneces-
sary work for federal judges.”  Therefore, it believed the more
favorable interpretation was that section 1658 applied to post-
1990 amendments to federal law where the amendment created
a cause of action that was not previously available.  The 1991
Act “enlarged the category of conduct that is subject to § 1981
liability.”  Therefore, the Court concluded the 1991 Act “fully
qualifie[d] as an Act of Congress enacted after [December 1,
1990] within the meaning of § 1658.”
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion for an 8-1 Court in
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders.5 It held that to establish
constructive discharge under Title VII, a claimant alleging sex-
ual harassment must show that the abusive work environment
became so intolerable that her resignation qualified as a fitting
response.  If the actions that created the intolerable work envi-
ronment were not sanctioned by the employer, the employer
may assert as an affirmative defense that (1) the employer had
in place an accessible and effective policy for reporting sexual
harassment and (2) the employee failed to avail herself of it.
Respondent, who was
employed by Pennsylvania
State Police (PSP), quit
work in response to the sex-
ual harassment of her male
supervisors and co-work-
ers.  She brought an action
against PSP under Title VII,
claiming constructive dis-
charge.  PSP sought dis-
missal based on the affirma-
tive defense set forth in
Faragher v. Boca Raton6 and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth.7 The Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense provides that
“when no tangible action is taken . . . the employer may raise
an affirmative defense to liability, subject to proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence:” (1) “that the employer exercised rea-
sonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior,” and (2) “that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise.”  The Court granted certiorari to resolve a cir-
cuit split regarding the application of the Ellerth/Faragher affir-
mative defense.  
The Court first restated the principles of constructive dis-
charge: “Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an
employee’s reasonable decision to resign because of unen-
durable working conditions is assimilated to a formal dis-
charge for remedial purposes.”  The inquiry is objective.  In
Ellerth and Faragher, the Court concluded that when a super-
visor takes tangible employment action against an employee, it
is “beyond question” that the employer is liable under agency
principles.  When a supervisor’s actions, however, did not cul-
minate in tangible employment action, the Court adopted the
“aided-by-the-agency-relation” standard for these scenarios, or
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.  In this case, the
Court concluded that the constructive discharge claim
stemmed from, “and can be regarded as an aggravated case of,
sexual harassment or hostile work environment” with the
addition that “[a] plaintiff who advances such a compound
claim must show working conditions so intolerable that a rea-
sonable person would have felt compelled to resign.”
However, as in Ellerth and Faragher this environment could
either result from official or unofficial supervisory conduct and
also was a combination of the employee’s decision to leave and
the precipitating conduct.  The Court determined that because
“a constructive discharge is functionally the same as an actual
termination in damages-enhancing respects,” the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense should be available to an
employer.  To hold otherwise “would make the graver claim of
hostile-environment constructive discharge easier to prove
than its lesser included component.”  The case was remanded
because genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to
whether PSP was entitled to the defense in this action.
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In General Dynamics
Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,8
a 6-3 Court, in a decision
written by Justice Souter,
held that the “text, struc-
ture, purpose, and history
of the [Age Discrimination
in Employment Act
(ADEA)], along with its
relationship to other fed-
eral statutes . . . show[] that
the statute [did] not mean
to stop an employer from
favoring an older employee
over a younger one.”  In
1997, petitioner entered
into a collective bargaining
agreement with the United Auto Workers that eliminated peti-
tioner’s “obligation to provide health benefits to subsequently
retired employees, except as the then-current workers at least
50 years old.”  Numerous employees filed an action claiming
the agreement violated the ADEA because it discriminated
against younger employees in favor of older.  In rejecting
respondent’s claim, the Court turned to the history of the
ADEA, the specific language of the statute, and case law.
Congress decided not to include age discrimination in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, “being aware that there were
legitimate reasons as well as invidious ones for making employ-
ment decisions on age.”  Congressional hearings held prior to
the ADEA’s enactment “dwelled on unjustified assumptions
about the effect of age on ability to work,” reflecting “the com-
mon facts that an individual’s chances to find and keep a job get
worse over time.”  There was nothing to suggest that “any
workers were registering complaints about discrimination in
favor of their seniors.”  The specific language of used in the
ADEA supported this conclusion.  The Court noted that there
is no suggestion in the introductory provisions that the ADEA
meant to protect discrimination in favor of senior employees.
Among other things, the introductory provisions “stress the
impediments suffered by ‘older workers . . . in their efforts to
retain . . . and especially to regain employment.’”  Case law also
supported the Court’s conclusion.  In Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins,9 the Court held “there is no violation of the ADEA in
firing an employee because his pension is about to vest, as a
basis for action that we took to be analytically distinct from age,
even though it would never occur without advanced years.”  In
its reasoning the Court stated that “‘the very essence of age dis-
crimination [is] for an older employee to be fired because the
employer believes that productivity and competence decline
with old age,’ . . . whereas discrimination on the basis of pen-
sion status ‘would not constitute discriminatory treatment on
the basis of age [because] the prohibited stereotype [of the fal-
tering worker] would not have figured in this decision, and the
attendant stigma would not ensue.’”  The Court stated that it
had used the reasoning in this case as a background for other
age discrimination cases and the “Courts of Appeals and the
District Courts ha[d] read the law the same way.”
FIRST AMENDMENT
In Locke v. Davey,10 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 7-
2 Court, held that Washington’s prohibition on giving scholar-
ships to students who wished to pursue a degree in devotional
theology is not inherently constitutionally suspect; therefore,
because the state’s interest in not funding religious studies was
substantial, and the burden it placed on the recipients of the
scholarship minimal, the program did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  Washington imple-
mented a Promise Scholarship Program that awarded scholar-
ships to students pursuing postsecondary education.
However, a student was not eligible for scholarship funds if he
or she pursued a degree in theology.  Respondent, who
received a scholarship but refused to sign a waiver stating he
would not pursue a degree in devotional theology, was denied
his scholarship funds.  He challenged the statute, arguing “the
denial of his scholarship based on his decision to pursue a the-
ology degree violated, inter alia, the Free Exercise,
Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First
Amendment.”  The Court did not agree.  First, it concluded
that “the link between government funds and religious train-
ing is broken by the independent and private choice of the
recipients.”  Therefore, even if a program recipient could and
chose to pursue a degree in devotional theology, the program
did not violate the Establishment Clause.  Second, as to the
Free Exercise Clause, the Court determined that Washington’s
decision not to fund a certain category of instruction was con-
stitutional.  Unlike in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
Hialeah,11 “the State’s disfavor (if it can be called that) is of a far
milder kind” and the program “does not require students to
choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a govern-
ment benefit.”  Furthermore, that the program funds secular
training did not necessarily require that it fund religious train-
ing.  The Court believed that the two are not “fungible.”  The
United States and the states’ constitutions have distinct views,
“in favor of free exercise, but opposed to establishment.”  That
the state treats training for religious professions differently
from training for secular professions is a product of these views
and “not evidence of hostility toward religion.”  Washington’s
constitution may be more strict than the Federal Constitution,
however, according to the Court, “the interest it seeks to fur-
ther is scarcely novel.”
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,12 the Court
did not reach the merits of respondent’s contention that the
words “under God” in the pledge of allegiance violate the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment and instead determined that respondent lacked
standing to maintain the action on behalf of his daughter.
Justice Stevens, writing for a five-person majority, determined
that a parent, who does not have the final decision-making
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authority over decisions regarding their child’s psychological
and educational well-being, does not have prudential standing
to challenge a school district’s policy regarding the pledge of
allegiance.  
The Court had two strands of jurisprudence regarding stand-
ing: (1) Article III standing, “which enforces the Constitution’s
case or controversy requirement;” and (2) “prudential standing,
which embodies ‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise
of federal jurisdiction.’”  The latter “encompasses ‘the general
prohibition on a litigants’ raising another person’s legal rights,
the rules barring adjudication of generalized grievances more
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the
requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of
interests protected by the law invoked.’”  The Court has con-
tinuously declined to interfere with domestic relations, believ-
ing “‘[t]he whole subject of domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, belongs to the law of the States and not
to the laws of the United States.’”  The daughter’s mother had
the ultimate decision-making power in case of a disagreement
regarding the daughter’s health, education, and welfare.
Nonetheless, “Newdow contend[ed] that despite [the mother’s]
final authority, he retain[ed] ‘an unrestricted right to inculcate
in his daughter—free from governmental interference—the
atheistic beliefs he finds persuasive.’”  However, the Court rec-
ognized that it was not only Newdow’s interest in inculcating
his child with his religious views, “but also the rights of the
child’s mother as a parent generally and under the Superior
Court orders specifically.”  The Court also recognized the
importance of the daughter’s rights “who finds herself at the
center of a highly public debate over her custody, the propriety
of a widespread national ritual, and the meaning of our
Constitution.” Newdow’s standing was derived from his rela-
tionship with his daughter, “but he lack[ed] the rights to liti-
gate as her next friend.”  First, in direct contrast with the
Court’s law on prudential standing, Newdow’s interests are not
parallel, “and, indeed, [were] potentially in conflict” with his
daughter’s interests.  Second, Newdow’s parental status was
defined by California domestic law.  The Court of Appeals, to
whom the Court would normally defer to in this instance given
its greater familiarity with California law, determined that “state
law vests in Newdow a cognizable right to influence his daugh-
ter’s religious upbringing.”  However, the Court did not see how
either the mother or the school board had done anything that
impairs this right.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court in City of
Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts,13 which held the special judicial review
procedures set forth in Freedman v. Maryland14 were not applic-
able to an adult business zoning ordinance; Colorado’s ordi-
nary judicial rules of review were adequate for First
Amendment protection.  The City of Littleton adopted a zon-
ing ordinance that required an adult business to obtain a
license to operate.  The application for the license required
numerous disclosures, and a denial of the license could be
appealed to the state district court, pursuant to the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Instead of applying for a license,
respondent opened a store and
brought an action to challenge
the zoning ordinance, claiming
Colorado law “[did] not assure
that [the city’s] license deci-
sions will be given expedited
[judicial] review,” hence it did
not assure “prompt final judi-
cial decision” as required by
the Constitution and the
Court’s decision in Freedman.
The City of Littleton, in turn,
argued (1) the Court, in
FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas,15 “found that the First Amendment
required such a scheme to provide an applicant with ‘prompt
access’ to judicial review of an administrative denial of the
license, but that the First Amendment did not require assur-
ance of a ‘prompt judicial determination’ of the applicant’s legal
claim;” and (2) that Colorado law satisfies any “prompt judi-
cial determination” requirement.  The Court rejected the first
argument, but accepted the second.
First, in Freedman, the Court set forth a number of safe-
guards necessary for constitutional protection in a censorship
situation, including prompt judicial review and determination.
Despite the City of Littleton’s arguments, FW/PBS “does not
purport to radically alter the nature of those core require-
ments.”  Of these core requirements, it was clear that the Court
still mandated prompt administrative and judicial determina-
tions. As to the second argument, the Court stated that the City
of Littleton “in effect, argues that [the Court] should modify
FW/PBS, withdrawing its implication that Freedman’s special
judicial review rules apply in this case.”  The Court agreed,
finding Colorado’s ordinary judicial review procedures suffice,
for four reasons: (1) courts may accelerate the hearing process
to avoid First Amendment violations; (2) the Court has “no rea-
son to doubt the willingness of Colorado’s judges” to use their
power to avoid First Amendment harm; (3) the First
Amendment harm in this instance is different than that in
Freedman, making a special procedure unnecessary (in
Freedman, the Court considered a subjective scheme while here,
the “licensing scheme applies reasonably objective, nondiscre-
tionary criteria unrelated to the content of the expressive mate-
rials that an adult business may sell or display”); and (4) the
Court notes “nothing in FW/PBS or in Freedman requires a city
or a State to place judicial review safeguards all in the city ordi-
nance that sets forth a licensing scheme.”
Congress enacted the Child Online Protection Act (COPA),
47 U.S.C. section 231, “to protect minors from exposure to
sexually explicit materials on the Internet.”  In Ashcroft v.
ACLU,16 Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion of a 6-3
Court, held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in granting respondent’s preliminary injunction to enjoin the
government from enforcing the criminal penalties set forth in
the statute.  The Court, in considering Congress’s second
attempt to make the Internet safe for minors, determined less
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restrictive means, i.e., filter-
ing software, existed to pre-
vent minors from accessing
harmful material on the
Internet and, therefore, it was
likely respondents might suc-
ceed on the merits.  
In reaching its determina-
tion to uphold the prelimi-
nary injunction, the Court
applied an abuse-of-discretion
standard of review.  In analyz-
ing whether the district court
abused its discretion, the
Court considered whether
“less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in
achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to
serve.”  The test “[was] not to consider whether the challenged
restriction [had] some effect in achieving Congress’s goal,
regardless of the restriction it imposes,” it was to “ensure that
speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the
goal, for it is important to assure that legitimate speech [was]
not chilled or punished.”  The primary concern of the district
court was the availability of blocking and filtering software; it
determined that this alternative provided a less restrictive
means to prevent children from accessing the information.  The
Court agreed: “Filters are less restrictive than COPA.  They
impose selective restrictions on speech on the receiving end,
not universal restrictions at the source.”  Furthermore, “pro-
moting the use of filters does not condemn as criminal any cat-
egory of speech, and so the potential chilling effect is elimi-
nated, or at least much diminished.” The Court made special
note of one contrary argument: “filtering software is not an
available alternative because Congress may not require it to be
used.”  Even though the Court made special note of the argu-
ment, it stated that the argument carries little weight “because
Congress undoubtedly may act to encourage it to be used.”
Furthermore, “the need for parental cooperation does not auto-
matically disqualify a proposed less restrictive alternative.”
FEDERALISM:  11th AMENDMENT
In Tennessee v. Lane,17 Justice Stevens delivered the opinion
of a 5-4 Court, which held that Congress had the power to
abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for
those classes of cases implicating the fundamental right of
access to courts.  Respondents filed an action alleging violation
of Title II.  Both respondents were paraplegics who used wheel-
chairs for mobility and claimed that the state denied them
access to, and the services of, the state court system by reason
of their disability.  Specifically, many court buildings in
Tennessee were inaccessible to them.  Title II, at issue here,
“prohibits any public entity from discriminating against ‘qual-
ified persons’ with disabilities in the provision or operation of
public services, programs, or activities.”  Title II also incorpo-
rates by reference section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, “which authorizes private citizens to bring suits for
money damages.”  Under the Eleventh Amendment, “Congress
may abrogate the State’s sovereign immunity if (1) it unequiv-
ocally expresses its intent and (2) acts pursuant to a valid grant
of constitutional authority.”  Only the second element was at
issue in this case.
The Court concluded that Congress’s abrogation of the
state’s sovereign immunity in the Title II context was a valid
exercise of its power.  In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,18 it held that
“Congress can abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity when it
does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the substantive guaran-
tees of that Amendment.”  The Court has recognized that this
broad power includes “the authority both to remedy and to
deter violation of rights guaranteed [by the Fourteenth
Amendment] by prohibiting somewhat broader swath of con-
duct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the
Amendment’s text,” i.e., prophylactic legislation that pro-
scribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and
deter unconstitutional conduct.”  However, Congress’s section
5 power is not unlimited: “it may not work a ‘substantive
change’ in the governing law.”  Applying this test in Board of
Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,19 the Court concluded that
Title I was not a valid exercise of Congress’s section 5 power
because “Congress exercise of its prophylactic § 5 power was
unsupported by a relevant history and pattern of constitutional
violations.”  Here, however, the Court found the opposite true:
“Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive
unequal treatment in the administration of state services and
programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental
rights.”  At this point, the Court stated that the only question
that remained was “whether Title II is an appropriate response
to this history and pattern of unequal treatment.”  First, it
determined the scope of that inquiry, determining that it need
not consider the application of Title II in general, but instead
could ask “whether Congress had the power under § 5 to
enforce the constitutional right of access to the courts.”  It con-
cluded that because “Title II unquestionably is valid § 5 legis-
lation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessi-
bility of judicial services, we need go no further.”
Under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a), student loans guaranteed
by a governmental entity are not included in general dis-
charges unless the bankruptcy court determines that excepting
the debt from the order would impose an “undue hardship” on
the debtor.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 7-2 Court,
determined in Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood20 that
state sovereign immunity was not implicated in a bankruptcy
proceeding where a petitioner must serve a summons and
complaint on the state in order to obtain an undue hardship
determination for the purpose of discharging his or her student
loans.  
The Court explained that the “discharge of a debt by a bank-
ruptcy court” was “similar to an in rem admiralty proceeding”
where the Court has determined that “the Eleventh
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Amendment does not bar federal jurisdiction . . . when the State
is not in possession of the property.”  Similarly, a bankruptcy
court has “jurisdiction over the debtor’s property, wherever
located, and over the estate.”  Furthermore, under the Court’s
longstanding precedent, “States, whether or not they choose to
participate in the [bankruptcy] proceeding, are bound by a
bankruptcy court’s discharge order no less than other credi-
tors.”  Therefore, according to the Court, the only question was
whether “the particular process by which student loan’s debts
are discharged unconstitutionally infringes” upon a state’s sov-
ereignty, i.e., service of a summons and a complaint. Section
528(a)(8) is self-executing: “[u]nless the debtor affirmatively
secures a hardship determination, the discharge order will not
include a student loan debt.”  However, even if Congress has
made it more difficult for an individual to discharge their stu-
dent loan debt, the proceeding is still in rem.  The Court reiter-
ated its prior discussions and stated, “we have previously
endorsed individualized determinations of State’s interests
within the federal courts in rem jurisdiction.”  The procedures
used in this case do not change the nature of the in rem pro-
ceeding.  Furthermore, the Court saw no need to engage in a
comparative analysis with the similarities to a traditional civil
trial.  The Court noted that “if the Bankruptcy Court had to
exercise personal jurisdiction over TSAC, such an adjudication
would implicate the Eleventh Amendment.”  However, a bank-
ruptcy proceeding was an in rem proceeding and, therefore,
“even when the underlying proceedings are, for the most part
identical,” meaning the procedure bears a striking resemblance
to a traditional civil suit, the similarities are irrelevant.
Likewise, it found “the issuance of process” does not implicate
state sovereign immunity.  The bankruptcy court could adjudi-
cate without personal jurisdiction over the state: the text of sec-
tion 532(a)(8) does not require a summons, “and absent Rule
7001(6) a debtor could proceed by motion.”  The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that there was “no reason why service of a
summons, which in this case [was] indistinguishable in practi-
cal effect from a motion, should be given dispositive weight.”
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court
in Frew v. Hawkins.21 It held state officials were not protected
by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity with respect to a
federal court’s enforcement of a consent decree.  Petitioners
brought an action against the state and its officials to enforce
certain provisions of Medicaid, specifically as they relate to the
Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment
(EPSDT) program.  The state was dismissed on Eleventh
Amendment grounds, and the petitioners and state officials
entered into a consent decree, which was approved by the dis-
trict court in 1996.  The enforcement of the consent decree was
at issue in this case.  The state officials claim “the Eleventh
Amendment rendered the decree unenforceable even if they
were in noncompliance” because petitioners had not shown a
violation of federal law.  According to the Court, “this case
involves the intersection of two areas of federal law: the reach
of the Eleventh Amendment and the rules governing consent
decrees.”  Ex parte Young,22
carved out a narrow exception
to the Eleventh Amendment,
allowing “suits for prospective
relief against state officials act-
ing in violation of federal law.”
Firefighters v. Cleveland23
requires that a consent decree
entered in a federal court must
“spring from, and serve to
resolve, a dispute within the
court’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion; must come within the
general scope of the case made
by the pleadings; and must
further the objective of the law
upon which the complaint was based.”  The Court did not read
into these requirements, as the state officials argued, that a con-
sent decree was not enforceable unless petitioners could prove
first a violation of federal law.  First, the consent decree was
properly entered by the district court and it stated a mandatory
and enforceable obligation: “The petitioners’ motion to enforce
. . . sought enforcement of a remedy consistent with Ex parte
Young and Firefighters, a remedy the state officials themselves
accepted when they asked the District Court to approve the
decree.”
In Engine Manufacturing Association v. South Coast Air
Quality Management Dist.24 an 8-1 Court held that the refer-
ence to “standards” in Section 209 of the Clean Air Act refers
merely to standards and not methods of enforcement; there-
fore, California’s mandates regarding the purchase of vehicles,
rather than the manufacture or sale, did not escape preemp-
tion.  Respondent, a political subdivision of California,
adopted six “fleet rules,” which applied to various operators of
fleets and “contain[ed] detailed prescriptions regarding the
types of vehicles that fleet operators must purchase or lease
when adding or replacing fleet vehicles.”  All six rules applied
to public operators, and three apply to private ones.  Petitioner
claimed the fleet rules were preempted by section 209 of the
Clean Air Act (CAA).  Section 209 provides: “No state or any
political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce
any standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this
part.   No State shall require certification, inspection, or any
other approval relating to the control of emissions . . . as con-
dition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or reg-
istration of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or
equipment.”  According to the Court, the resolution of this
case depended upon the interpretation of the word “standard.”
The lower courts, and respondent, “engraft[ed] onto this
meaning . . . a limiting component, defining it as only ‘[a] pro-
duction mandat[e] that require[s] manufacturers to ensure
that the vehicles they produce have particular emissions char-
acteristics.’”  The Court, however, believed this interpretation
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“confuse[d] standards with
the means of enforcing stan-
dards.”
PRESIDENTIAL POWER
In Rasul v. Bush,25 the
Court determined that alien
petitioners were not barred
from bringing a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the
District Court for the District
of Columbia, which had
jurisdiction over the petition-
ers’ custodians, even though
they were being held outside the United States; section 2241 by
its terms did not require that the petitioners reside in the dis-
trict in which they were bringing their petitions, only that the
court had jurisdiction over the custodians.  Petitioners were
foreign nationals being held in the United States Naval Base in
Guantanamo Bay under Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF).  In 2002, petitioners, through relatives acting
as their next friends, filed various actions in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, “challenging the
legality of their detention at the Base.”  
Justice Stevens, writing for a five-justice majority, began by
stating that under 28 U.S.C. section 2241, Congress had
granted federal courts “the authority to hear applications for
habeas corpus by any person who claims to be held ‘in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.’”  The government relied primarily on Johnson v.
Eisentrager26 to support its argument that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ.  In Eisentrager, the Court
held that the district court lacked authority to issue a writ to
German citizens “who had been captured by U.S. forces in
China, tried and convicted . . . by an American military com-
mission in Nanking, and incarcerated in the Landsberg Prison
in occupied Germany.” The Court stated that the prisoners in
this case differed from those in Eisentrager: (1) they were not
nationals of countries at war with the United States; (2) they
denied they had engaged in or plotted acts of aggression
against the United States; (3) they had never been afforded
access to any tribunal, or charged with any wrongdoing; and
(4) they had been imprisoned “in territory over which the
United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.” 
The Court determined that the holding in Eisentrager was
justified at the time, but a similar result was not justified here.
At the time Eisentrager was decided, the Court had just
decided Ahrens v. Clark,27 “a case concerning the application of
the habeas statute to the petitions of 120 Germans who were
then being detained at Ellis Island . . . for deportation.”  In
Ahrens, the Court held that the district court lacked jurisdic-
tion to review the petitions because the statute required that
the petitioners be present in the jurisdiction in which they
bring their petition.  The Court of Appeals, in issuing its
Eisentrager decision shortly after Ahrens, found an unconstitu-
tional gap that had to be filled by reference to “fundamentals.”
The Ahrens Court also ignored this gap and addressed only the
constitutional issues raised in the Court of Appeals’s decision.
This gap had since been filled: In Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court of Ky.,28 the Court held, “contrary to Ahrens, that the
prisoner’s presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court is not ‘an invariable prerequisite’ to the exercise of
district court jurisdiction.”  Instead, what was important was
whether the person who holds the petitioner in custody was
within the jurisdictional limits of the district court.  The Court
concluded that because Braden “overruled the statutory predi-
cate to Eisentrager’s holding, Eisentrager plainly [did] not pre-
clude the exercise of § 2241 jurisdiction over petitioner’s
claims.”  Furthermore, the Court believed that “application of
the habeas statute to persons detained at the base [was] con-
sistent with the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus.”
At common law, courts readily applied the writ to persons
being held within the territorial limits of the nation, “as well as
the claims of persons detained in the so-called ‘exempt juris-
dictions,’ where ordinary writs did not run.”
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,29 Justice O’Connor announced the
judgment of the Court, which concluded that a citizen, who
was an enemy combatant being held pursuant to Authorization
for Use of Military Force (the AUMF), was entitled to some
due process of the law.  After the September 11 terrorist
attacks, Congress passed a resolution, AUMF, authorizing the
President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
or harbored such organizations or person, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nation, organizations, or person.”  Hamdi, an
American citizen, was arrested by friendly forces in
Afghanistan in 2001 and had been held in the United States
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay since January 2002.  Hamdi’s
father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. section 2241, on Hamdi’s behalf and as his next
friend, claiming that Hamdi’s detention was not legally autho-
rized and that, as a United States citizen, Hamdi was entitled
to “the full protections of the Constitution.”  
Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, framed the
threshold issue in this case as “whether the Executive has the
authority to detain citizens who qualify as ‘enemy combat-
ants.’”  The plurality found that “Congress [had] in fact autho-
rized Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF,” by authorizing
the President to use “necessary and appropriate force.”  The
plurality agreed that Hamdi could not be held indefinitely, but
read the AUMF as only authorizing detention as long as “the
relevant conflict” was still ongoing.  The plurality then deter-
mined “what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who
disputes his enemy-combatant status.”  Its analysis involved
both an examination of the writ of habeas corpus and the Due
Process Clause.  As to the writ, the parties agreed that “absent
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suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to
every individual detained within the United States.”  The par-
ties also agreed that Congress had not suspended the writ in
this instance. Therefore, the plurality must conclude that
“Hamdi was properly before an Article III court to challenge
his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”  The parties also agreed
that section 2241 “provide[s] at least a skeletal outline of the
procedures to be afforded a petitioner in federal habeas
review,” most notably, § 2243 provides that “‘the person
detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the
return or allege any other material facts,’ and § 2246 allows the
taking of evidence in habeas proceedings by deposition, affi-
davit, or interrogatories.”  The question then was what due
process was required.  The plurality recognized that both par-
ties “highlight[ed] legitimate concerns:” (1) the government
“in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the enemy
during a war do not return to battle against the United States;”
and (2) Hamdi’s asserted private “interest of being free from
physical detention by one’s own government.”  The plurality
recognized the latter interest was not reduced by the “circum-
stances of war or the accusation of treasonous behavior.”  The
plurality used the balancing test set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge30 for determining the procedures that are necessary to
ensure that a citizen is not “‘deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law,’” and concluded that “a citi-
zen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an
enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for
his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision-
maker.”  However, at the same time, the plurality conceded
that in a time of war, it must not unduly burden the govern-
ment.  Therefore, the government’s burden of proof might be
relaxed in some ways, i.e., the use of hearsay evidence.  
Justice Scalia disputed that the AUMF “authorize[d] deten-
tion of a citizen with the clarity necessary to satisfy the inter-
pretative canon that statutes should be construed so as to avoid
grave constitutional concerns . . . or with the clarity necessary
to overcome the statutory prescriptions that ‘no citizen shall be
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except
pursuant to an Act of Congress.’”  He also noted that Congress
failed to suspend a detainee’s right to seek a writ.  Therefore,
instead of “making up for Congress’s failure to invoke the
Suspension Clause and its making up for the Executive’s fail-
ure to apply what it says are needed procedures,” the Court
should have concluded that “Hamdi [was] entitled to a habeas
decree requiring his release unless (1) criminal proceedings are
promptly brought, or (2) Congress has suspended the writ of
habeas corpus.”  
Justice Souter, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment, also believed the Government had
shown that “the Force Resolution authorize[d] the detention
complained of here even on the facts the Government claims.”
Furthermore, Justice Souter concluded that if Hamdi was
being held as a prisoner of war, then his treatment must also
fall within the Geneva Convention, which would require,
among other things, “a ‘writ-
ten record . . . of proceed-
ings.’”  He would not reach
the question of what process
Hamdi was due because he
would find that the govern-
ment was not authorized to
detain Hamdi in the first
place.  Justice Thomas also
dissented, but reached the
conclusion that petitioner’s
writ should fail: “This deten-
tion falls squarely within the Federal Government’s war pow-
ers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess
that decision.”
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla,31 a 5-4 Court dismissed the habeas
petition of a detainee being held pursuant to the Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF) because the petitioner
named the Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld as the
respondent instead of Commander of the Consolidated Naval
Brig, Melanie A. Marr, who was his actual physical custodian.
Petitioner also filed his action in the Southern District of New
York when he was being held in South Carolina.  The Court
broke down the question of whether the Southern District had
jurisdiction over Padilla’s petition into two related subques-
tions: (1) “who [was] the proper respondent to the petition?”;
and (2) “[did] the Southern District have jurisdiction over him
or her?”  As to the first subquestion, the Court wrote: “The
federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the
proper respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who has
custody over [the petitioner].’”  Generally, there is only one
proper respondent in a petition, the custodian, who is “‘the
person’ with the ability to produce the prisoner’s body before
the habeas court.” There are exceptions to this rule, but the
Court found that neither the recognized nor proposed ones
were applicable here. The case law instead stood for the “sim-
ple proposition that the immediate physical custodian rule, by
its terms, [did] not apply when a habeas petitioner challenges
something other than his present physical confinement.”  The
Court turned to the second subquestion and concluded that
the District Court did not have jurisdiction over Commander
Marr: “District courts are limited to granting habeas relief
‘within their respective jurisdictions.’”  The Court interpreted
this rule to require only that “the court issuing the writ have
jurisdiction over the custodian.”  Congress added the limiting
clause that district courts could only issue a writ “within their
respective jurisdictions.”  Accordingly, “with respect to habeas
petitions ‘designed to relieve an individual from oppressive
confinement,’” the traditional rule is that “the Great Writ is
issuable only in the district of confinement.”  The Court also
relied on other portions of the habeas statute and legislative
history to support its conclusion.  For example, “if a petitioner
seeks habeas relief in the court of appeals, or from this Court 
. . . the petitioner must ‘state the reasons for not making appli-
cation to the district court of the district in which the applicant
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is held.’”  Also, it was clear
that Congress legislated
against a backdrop of a “dis-
trict of confinement” rule as
evidenced by the exceptions
to the rule.
ELECTIONS
In McConnell v. Federal
Elections Commn,32 the Court
reviewed various provisions
contained in Titles I through
V of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).  BCRA’s enactment followed the
Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo33 and a Senate investigation
into soft-money contributions, issue advertising, and the polit-
ical practices involved in the 1996 federal elections.  Its central
provisions “are designed to address Congress’ concerns about
the increasing use of soft money and issue advertising to influ-
ence federal elections.”  Certain provisions also attempt to pro-
vide limitations on contributions.  “Soft money” refers to con-
tributions made to state and local elections, but are used to
support federal elections.  Soft money is money raised and
spent by political parties that is not covered by limits on con-
tributions to candidates and committees in federal elections.
Issue advertising consists of communications that do not
expressly advocate the election or defeat of clearly identified
candidates, i.e., use “the magic words” “Elect John Smith,” but
are functionally identical to such express advocacy.  Plaintiffs
challenged these provisions as facially invalid under the First
Amendment, and as violating the Election Clause, federalism,
and equal protection.  Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Breyer wrote various portions of
the opinion.  The Court applied Buckley’s closely drawn
scrutiny test: a test less exacting than strict scrutiny, but that
showed “proper deference to Congress ability to weigh com-
peting constitutional interests in an area which it enjoys par-
ticular expertise.”  
In sum, the Court upheld the provisions of Title I, which are
Congress’s attempt to plug the loophole regarding the use of
soft money.  It also upheld the majority of the provisions in
Title II, relating to issue advertising, except to the extent it
attempted to limit party spending during post-nomination and
pre-election.  This unconstitutional provision required parties
to choose between two spending options: (1) a party making
an independent expenditure was barred from making a coordi-
nated expenditure; or (2) a party making a coordinated expen-
diture could not make an independent expenditure “for express
advocacy.”  The Court had previously held that caps on indi-
vidual compensations were unconstitutional and, therefore,
only addressed this statute as it applied to “coordinated expen-
ditures.”   The Court concluded that “while the category of
burdened speech [was] relatively small, it plainly [was] enti-
tled to First Amendment protection.”  It found the government
did not have a compelling interest in having the parties “avoid
the use of magic words”: “Any claim that a restriction on inde-
pendent express advocacy serve[d] a strong Government inter-
est [was] belied by the overwhelming evidence that the line
between express advocacy and other types of election-influ-
encing expression is, for Congress’ purposes, functionally
meaningless.”  Indeed, the Court concluded, Congress defined
“electioneering communications” because it recognized the
inadequacy of the “express advocacy” test.
The Court avoided ruling on most of the challenged provi-
sions under Title III and IV on standing grounds, including:
(1) an amendment to the Federal Communications Act, which
required broadcast stations, within certain time periods to “sell
a qualified candidate the ‘lowest unit charge of the station for
the same class and amount of time for the same period;’” (2)
the new provision “increases and indexes for inflation certain
FECA contribution limits;” and (3) the “millionaire provi-
sions,” which “provide[d] for a series of staggered increases in
otherwise applicable contribution-to-candidate limits in the
candidate’s opponent spends a triggering amount of his per-
sonal funds.”  It did, however, determine that the limits placed
on contributions by minors unconstitutional: “Limitations on
the amount that an individual may contribute to a candidate or
political committee impinge on the protected freedoms of
expression and association.”  
The Court finally considered Title V, amending the
Communications Act of 1934.  The amendment required
“broadcasters to keep publicly available records of politically
related broadcasting requests.”  As to the first provision, the
Court determined that the regulation was virtually identical to
the provision enacted by the Federal Communications
Commission in 1938 and “which with slight modifications the
FCC [had] maintained in effect ever since.”  Therefore, the
Court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that the provision was
“intolerably burdensome and invasive.”  For the same reasons,
the Court also rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that there were no
important governmental interests.  The FCC had pointed out
that “these records are necessary to permit political candidates
and others to verify that licensees have complied with their
obligations relating to use of their facilities by candidates for
political office pursuant to the equal time provision.”  As to the
second provision, referred to as “election message request”
requirements, which required broadcasters to keep records of
broadcast messages that refer to “a legally qualified candidate”
or to “any election to Federal Office,” the Court determined
that, although broader than the “candidate requests,” they
served essentially the same purpose.  For the same reasons dis-
cussed above, the Court could not find that they imposed an
undue administrative burden and determined that they were
supported by an important government interest.  Finally, the
Court addressed the third provision, or the “issue require-
ment,” which required broadcasters to keep records of requests
to broadcast “message[s] related to a national legislative issue
of public importance . . . or otherwise relating to a political
matter of national importance.”  It found that this provision
was “likely to help the FCC determine whether broadcasters
[were] carrying out their ‘obligations to afford reasonable
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of
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public importance,’ and whether broadcasters were too heavily
favoring entertainment, and discriminating against broadcasts
devoted to public affairs.”  The Court found that the statute
was not overbroad because of its use of the term “national
affairs,” which was no broader than language Congress has
used in other contexts to impose other obligations on broad-
casters.
In Vieth v. Jubelirer,34 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality,
determined that the Court’s decision in Davis v. Bandemer35 was
in error: political gerrymander claims were not justiciable.
Justices Stevens and Souter, the latter who was joined by
Justice Ginsburg, would hold that political gerrymander claims
were justiciable on a district level, while Justices Breyer and
Kennedy would continue to adjudicate them on a statewide
level.  
Plaintiffs challenged Pennsylvania’s redistricting plan, alleg-
ing, among other things, it constituted an unconstitutional
gerrymander.  Political gerrymandering existed before the con-
stitution was signed and “remained alive and well . . . at the
time of the framing.”  The Framers provided a remedy in the
Constitution, Article I, section 4, leaving “in state legislatures
the initial power to draw districts for federal elections,” but
permitting Congress to “‘make or alter’ those districts if it
wished.”  Congress had continuously attempted to restrain the
practice of political gerrymander.  The Court too had taken a
role: “[e]ighteen years ago, we held [in Bandemer] that the
Equal Protection Clause grants judges the power—and duty—
to control political gerrymandering.”  However, since that
decision, the Court had failed to articulate a judicially discov-
erable and manageable standard for resolving political gerry-
mander claims, indicating that they were likely “political ques-
tions” or nonjusticiable claims.
The plurality began its analysis by stating that the “judicial
power” created by Article III, was not the power of a court to
do whatever it wishes, but “the power to act in the manner tra-
ditional for English and American courts.”  One important tra-
dition was that a court’s action be governed by standard, by
rule.  In Bandemer, six justices determined “since it was ‘not
persuaded that there are no judicially discernible and manage-
able standards by which political gerrymander cases are to be
decided,’ . . . such cases were justiciable.”  This decision
improperly shifted the burden of proof.  Furthermore, the six
justices could not decide on what standard should apply, four
applying a different standard than the other two.  Since
Bandemer, the Court had not revisited the issue, although
lower courts have continually applied the plurality standard,
essentially resulting in the refusal of a court to intervene:
“[t]hroughout its subsequent history, Bandemer had served
almost exclusively as an invitation to litigation without much
prospect of redress.”  The plurality addressed each of the dis-
sent’s proposed standards and the plaintiffs’ proposed standard,
finding that none were workable.  
Justice Stevens would “require courts to consider political
gerrymander challenges at the individual-district level,” much
like the Court’s standard in racial gerrymandering cases.
Justice Souter, like Justice
Stevens, would “restrict these
plaintiffs, on the allegations
before us, to district-specific
political gerrymandering
claims.”  However, Justice
Souter “recognize[d] that there
is no existing workable stan-
dard for adjudicat[ing] such
claims.”  The standard he cre-
ated was loosely based on Title
VII cases, “complete with a
five-step prima facie test sewn
together from parts of, among
other things, our Voting Rights
Act jurisprudence, law review
articles, and apportionment
cases.”  Justice Breyer would attack the problem on a statewide
level.  He proposes the criterion that “nothing is more precise
than ‘the unjustified use of political factors to entrench a minor-
ity in power.’”  He invoked the Equal Protection Clause, but
“unjustified entrenchment” was really measured by his own
theory of “effective government.”  Justice Kennedy also recog-
nized the shortcomings of the other standards considered to
date, but “conclude[d] that courts should continue to adjudi-
cate such claims because a standard may one day be discov-
ered.”
CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In Hibbs v. Winn,36 a 5-4 Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Ginsburg, determined that the Tax Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. section 1341, did not bar a lawsuit questioning the con-
stitutionality of a state tax, it only barred those suits filed by
taxpayers seeking to avoid payment of tax liabilities.  Arizona
law “authorize[d] income-tax credits for payments to organi-
zations that award educational scholarships and tuition grants
to children attending private schools.”  Respondents brought
an action seeking to enjoin the state from giving tax credits on
Establishment Clause grounds.  The state sought dismissal
based upon the TIA, which prohibits a lower federal court
from restraining “the assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law.”  The Court stated that “[t]o determine
whether this litigation falls within the TIA’s prohibition, it
[was] appropriate, first, to identify the relief sought.”  The
Court concluded respondent was seeking only prospective
relief.  The next question then was whether the relief sought
seeks to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or
collection of any tax under State law.”  The answer, the Court
stated, turned on the meaning of the word “assessment.”  
Turning to the Internal Revenue Code and then the context
in which the word assessment was used in the TIA, the Court
concluded “an assessment [was] closely tied to the collection
of a tax, i.e., the assessment [was] the official recording of lia-
bility that triggers levy and collection efforts.”  The Court next
turned to the history of the TIA to support its conclusion.  It
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stated: “Congress modeled
[TIA] upon earlier federal
‘statutes of similar import,’
laws that, in turn, paralleled
state provisions proscribing
‘actions in State courts to
enjoin the collection of State
and county taxes.’”  Congress
drew heavily on the Anti-
Injunction Act (AIA), “which
bars ‘any court’ from enter-
taining a suit brought ‘for the purpose of restraining the assess-
ment or collection of any [federal] tax.’”  The Court had rec-
ognized that AIA served two purposes: (1) it protects the gov-
ernment’s need to assess and collect taxes in a timely fashion;
and (2) “require[s] that the legal right to the disputed sums be
determined in a suit for refund.”  Similarly, the TIA “shields” a
state’s assessment and collection of taxes from federal-court
restraints.  Also, it forces individuals who wish to challenge the
assessment of taxes to pursue those procedures specified by
the taxing authority.  The Court next pointed out that in prior
cases involving the TIA, it had recognized TIA’s principal pur-
pose as limiting “drastically federal-court interference with the
collection of [state] taxes.”  Most telling for the Court were its
prior cases dealing with desegregation.  The Court stated: “In
a procession of cases not rationally distinguishable from this
one, no Justice or member of the bar of this Court ever raised
a § 1341 objection that, according to the petitioner in this case,
should have caused us to order dismissal of the action for want
of jurisdiction.”
A unanimous Court in Barnhart v. Thomas37 determined the
Social Security Administration (SSA) did not need to consider
whether a claimant’s previous job existed in significant num-
bers in the national economy when determining whether the
claimant was disabled.  Respondent, a former elevator operator,
applied for disability benefits, which were denied by the SSA.
An administrative law judge concluded that she was not dis-
abled because “her ‘impairments do not prevent [her] from per-
forming her past relevant work as an elevator operator.’”  The
ALJ rejected respondent’s argument that because the work no
longer existed “in significant numbers in the national econ-
omy,” she was unable to do her work, as did the Court.  Title II’s
definition of disability is qualified by the language that “[a]n
individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if
his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but can-
not, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy.”  The question before the Court was
whether “exists in the national economy” only modified the
“substantial gainful work” or whether it also modified “unable
to do his previous work.”  The SSA had determined that it did
not need to determine whether a claimant’s previous work
“exist[ed] in the national economy.”  Because the SSA was the
agency charged with enforcement of this statute, the Court, in
accordance with its decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,38 must defer to the SSA’s deter-
mination if it was reasonable.  The Court found that it was.
Grammatical rules regarding the last antecedent state “a limit-
ing clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying
only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”
Furthermore, the SSA’s interpretation did not “lead to ‘absurd
results.’”  The Third Circuit concluded that there was “no plau-
sible reason why Congress might have wanted to deny benefits
to an otherwise qualified person simply because that person,
although unable to perform any job that actually exists in the
national economy, could perform a previous job that no longer
exists.”  In response, the Court identified the “proxy theory”:
“Congress could have determined that an analysis of a
claimant’s physical and mental capacity to do his previous work
would ‘in the vast majority of cases’ serve as an effective and
efficient administrative proxy for the claimant’s ability to do
some work that does exist in the national economy.”  The Court
recognized that this proxy rationale might produce undesirable
results in some circumstances; however, it stated “[t]hat [the
Third Circuit’s] logic would invalidate a vast number of the pro-
cedures employed by the administrative state;” every legal rule
has imperfect applications.
Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
“Exemption 7(C) excuses from disclosure ‘records or informa-
tion compiled for law enforcement purposes’ if their produc-
tion could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy.”  In National Archives and
Records Administration v. Favish,39 a unanimous Court held that
Exemption 7(C) recognized family members’ rights to per-
sonal privacy in the death-scene images of their close relative.
In order to overcome this privacy interest, a requester must (1)
assert a significant public interest to be advanced by the infor-
mation sought; and (2) where the interest sought to be
advanced was that the government acted negligently or inap-
propriately, produce sufficient evidence that would warrant
belief by a reasonable person that the alleged government
impropriety might have occurred.  
The Court agreed with NARA’s denial of respondent’s
request under the FIOA for the death scene photos of Vincent
Foster, Jr., deputy counsel to President Clinton.  It notes that
the Exemption 7(C)’s language was “in marked contrast to the
language in Exemption 6, pertaining to ‘personnel and medical
files,’ where withholding [was] required only if disclosure
‘would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.’”  The Court drew two conclusions from these differ-
ences: (1) the use of the word “clearly” and the use of the
phrase “would constitute” versus “could reasonably,” clearly
indicates Exemption 7(C) was broader than Exemption 6; and
(2) the data compiled in law enforcement documents contain
information on individuals other than the person being inves-
tigated, i.e., witnesses and initial suspects.  As to the latter, the
Court wrote, “[t]here [was] special reason, therefore, to give
protection to this intimate personal data, to which the public
does not have a general right of access in the ordinary course.”
The Court
assume[d]
Congress legislated
against this 
background of
law, scholarship,
and history . . . .
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First, traditional burial rights and common law acknowledge
“a family’s control over the body and death images of the
deceased.”  The Court “assume[d] Congress legislated against
this background of law, scholarship, and history” as well as
“the background of the Attorney General’s consistent interpre-
tation of the exemption to protect members of the family of the
person to whom the information pertains.”  The protection in
Exemption 7(C) “[went] beyond the common law and the
Constitution” and, therefore, “it would be anomalous to hold
in the instant case that the statutes provide[d] even less pro-
tection than does the common law.”  Second, if the Court
adopted Favish’s position, “child molesters, rapists, murderers,
and other violent criminals” could obtain information regard-
ing their victims.  FOIA requests cannot be denied based on
the identity of the person; therefore, the Court’s holding
“ensure[d] that the privacy interests of surviving family mem-
bers would allow the Government to deny these gruesome
requests in appropriate cases.”
The Court stated that its conclusion above did not end its
inquiry.  While a family’s privacy interest falls within the
exemption, “the statute directs nondisclosures only where the
information ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion’ of the family’s personal privacy.”
According to the Court, “[t]he term ‘unwarranted’ requires [it]
to balance the family’s privacy interest against the public inter-
est in disclosure.”  Therefore, while the person requesting the
information typically need not give a reason for a request,
when limitations, such as personal privacy protection, come
into play, he or she must.  The Court applied a balancing test,
stating that the person requesting the information must “estab-
lish a sufficient reason for disclosure” by showing that: (1)
“the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one,
an interest more specific than having the information for its
own sake;” and (2) “the information is likely to advance that
interest.”
OTHER SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS
In Bedroc Limited, LLC v. United States,40 the Court declined
to extend its holding in Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,41 relating
to the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (SRHA), to the
Pittman Underground Water Act of 1919.  The issue before the
Court was whether sand and gravel were “valuable minerals”
reserved to the United States in any land grants made under
the Pittman Act.  While the Court determined that gravel con-
stituted a mineral under the SRHA reserved to the United
States, the plurality, in this instance, determined that sand and
gravel were not “valuable minerals” reserved to the United
States under the Pittman Act.  The Court relied on the plain
language of the Pittman Act, which referred to valuable miner-
als and the statutory context of the Act as it related to the
General Mining Act, under which sand and gravel would not
constitute “valuable mineral deposit[s].”  Justice Thomas con-
curred in the judgment but believed the Court relied too heav-
ily on the Acts use of the word “valuable.”
In Virginia v. Maryland,42 a 7-2 Court resolved the latest dis-
pute between the two states
relating to use of the Potomac
River.  Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, held
that Maryland did not have the
right to regulate Virginia’s con-
struction of the water intake
structures or water withdrawal.
The Court concluded that even
though Maryland owned the
river-bed to the low-water
mark, the 1785 Compact
granted Virginia the right to build improvements from its shore
and the Black-Jenkins Award did not in any way limit those
rights.  The state’s long-standing dispute regarding ownership
of the river led to two major resolutions: (1) the 1785
Compact, which “resolved many important navigational and
jurisdictional issues, but did not determine the boundary line
between the States;” and (2) the Black-Jenkins Award, an arbi-
tration award issued in 1877, which placed the boundary line
between the states at the low-water mark on the Virginia shore
of the Potomac, thereby awarding Maryland ownership of the
entire bed of the river.  The latter, however, also awarded
Virginia “such right to such use of the river beyond the line of
low-water mark as may be necessary to the full enjoyment of
her riparian ownership, without impeding the navigation or
otherwise interfering with the proper use of it by Maryland,
agreeably to the compact of seventeen hundred and eighty-
five.”  In 1933, “Maryland established a permitting system for
water withdrawal and waterway construction taking place
within the Maryland territory” and, for the last 50 years, has
issued numerous permits to Virginia entities.  Virginia now
contended that Maryland’s regulation of the river was in viola-
tion of the 1785 Compact and Black-Jenkins Award.
The Court agreed.  Prior to the 1785 Compact and the
Black-Jenkins Award, the ownership of the river was contested.
However, the Award, while vesting ownership in Maryland,
also granted Virginia “the sovereign right to use the River
beyond the low-water mark.”  Thus, the Court concluded,
“Maryland’s necessary concession that Virginia own[ed] the
soil to the low-water mark must also doom her claim that
Virginia [did] not possess riparian rights appurtenant to those
lands to construct improvements beyond the low-water mark
and otherwise make use of the water in the River.”  The Court
also concluded that “[i]n granting Virginia sovereign riparian
rights, the arbitrators did not construe or alter any private
rights . . . rather, they held that Virginia had gained sovereign
rights by prescription.”  
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of whether Virginia
“ha[d] lost her sovereign riparian rights by acquiescing in
Maryland’s regulation of her water withdrawal and waterway
construction activities.”  To succeed, Maryland needed to show
by a preponderance of the evidence “[1] a long and continuous
. . . assertion of sovereignty over Virginia’s riparian activities, as
well as [2] Virginia’s acquiescence in her prescriptive acts.”
In Virginia v.
Maryland, a 7-2
Court resolved
the latest dispute
between the two
states relating to
the use of the
Potomac River.
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The Court concluded that
Maryland “ha[d] not carried
her burden.”  First, although
the period for prescription by
one state over another was
not set, the Court had previ-
ously indicated that it must
be “substantial.”  The pre-
scriptive period began in
1957, when Maryland issued
its first permit, and ended in
2000, when Virginia sought
leave to file a complaint in this Court.  The Court believed in
this circumstance, where Virginia’s sovereign right was clearly
established and Maryland sought to defeat those rights, “it
[was] far from clear that such a short prescriptive period [was]
sufficient as a matter of law.”  Second, the Court stated that
even if this amount of time was sufficient, Maryland had not
shown Virginia’s acquiescence.  In 1976, during a dispute
between the states about water rights, Maryland tried to assert
exclusive authority to allocate the water of the Potomac.
Virginia protested Maryland’s position.  Therefore, contrary to
Maryland’s assertions, Virginia had not acquiesced to
Maryland’s assertions that it had regulatory authority over con-
struction and water withdrawal.
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court in
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance,43 which held the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did not provide a remedy
to compel the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to ban the
use of off-road vehicles (ORVs) in certain wilderness areas.
Furthermore, the land use plan itself was agency action so
there was no duty to supplement the environmental impact
statement prepared in compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  The Court first provided a
lengthy summary of the statutes that applied to this case.  In
brief, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)
“establishe[d] a dual regime of inventory and planning.”  In
addition, The Wilderness Act of 1964 required the Department
of Interior to designate some lands as wilderness areas, which
“subject to certain exceptions, shall [have] no motorized vehi-
cles, and no manmade structures.”  The Secretary of the
Interior had “identified so-called ‘wilderness study areas’
(WSAs), roadless lands of 5,000 acres or more that possess
‘wilderness characteristics,’ as determined in the Secretary’s
land inventory.”  WSAs, as well as some previously designated
lands, “have been subjected to further examination and public
comment in order to evaluate their suitability for designation
as wilderness.”  The BLM designated portions of Utah as
WSAs.  It continued to operate those areas under land man-
agement plans and allow access by ORVs.  Respondents argued
that the BLM’s actions violated the BLM’s nonimpairment
obligation under FLPMA and that the BLM was required to
implement provisions in its land use plans relating to ORV use.
Furthermore, respondents contended that the BLM had failed
to take a “hard look” at whether, pursuant to the NEPA, it
should have undertaken supplemental environmental analyses
for areas in which ORV had increased.  The Court concluded
that respondents had not stated a claim for relief.  
The APA “authorize[d] suit by ‘[a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute.’”  The reviewing court “shall . . . compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”  The Court
stated that “the only action that can be compelled under the
APA [was] an action legally required.”  Thus, the APA barred
“any kind of broad programmatic attack,” such as the Court
rejected in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation.44
Furthermore, a court cannot compel an agency to act in a cer-
tain manner.  With these principles in mind, the Court turned
to the present action, analyzing each claim in turn.  SUWA’s
first claim was that BLM “violated its mandate to continue to
manage [WSAs] . . . in a manner so as not to impair the suit-
ability of such areas for wilderness.”  The Court stated that the
provisions under FLPMA were mandatory, but “[left] BLM a
great deal of discretion in deciding how to achieve it.”
Therefore, the Court determined that it could not compel BLM
to comply with the nonimpairment mandate, without telling
BLM how to comply with the mandate.  Similarly, the Court
could grant relief on SUWAs allegations that the BLM failed to
comply with “certain provisions of its land use plans” as that
would require the Court to compel the BLM to take certain
actions. The Court finally turned to SUWA’s third claim.  Prior
to deciding if a NEPA-duty was actionable under the APA, the
Court first decided whether any duty exists.  NEPA required
that a federal agency prepare an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) “as part of any ‘proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.’”  SUWA argued “that evidence of
increased ORV use [was] ‘significant new circumstance or
information’ that require[d] a ‘hard look,’” thus, creating a
duty to supplement the EIS.  “The Court disagreed.  The
approval of a land use plan was a major federal action; how-
ever, “that action [was] completed when the plan [was]
approved.”  The plan “[was] the ‘proposed action’ contem-
plated by the regulation,” and, therefore, there [was] no ongo-
ing action that would require supplementation.
In Cheney v. District Court,45 the Court, in an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Kennedy, determined that when a court consid-
ers whether to issue a writ of mandamus in a civil action that
involves the President or Vice President, it should not deny the
writ on the grounds other relief was available because the
President and Vice President can assert Executive Privilege.
The Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club filed separate actions,
later consolidated, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to
require the National Energy Policy Development Group
(NEPDG), an advisory committee established by President
Bush, to produce all material subject to requirements of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).  The district court
issued a writ of mandamus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section
1361, allowing respondents to conduct limited, “tightly-
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reined” discovery into the issue of whether “‘non-federal
employees,’ including ‘private lobbyists,’ ‘regularly attended
and fully participated in non-public meetings.’”  If they did,
they were considered de facto members of the committee,
which would subject NEPDG to FACA’s disclosure require-
ments.
The common-law writ of mandamus was codified by 28
U.S.C. section 1651(a).  It is “drastic and extraordinary” and
should only be issued if: (1) no other adequate relief exists; (2)
the right to relief is “clear and indisputable;” and (3) “the issu-
ing court, in its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is
appropriate under the circumstances.”  The Court stated that
because Vice President Cheney was a party to the case, it was
removed from “ordinary” and the Court’s analysis was differ-
ent.  The orders issued by the district court “threaten[ed] sub-
stantial intrusions on the process by which those in closest
operational proximity to the President advise the President.”
The Court believed that “separation-of-powers considerations
should inform a court of appeals’ evaluation of a mandamus
petition involving the President or the Vice President.”  The
Court concluded that the lower court’s reliance on United
States v. Nixon46 to establish that the Vice President and his for-
mer colleagues were responsible for asserting particularized
privileges was misplaced.  Nixon dealt with criminal proceed-
ings while this one was civil.  According to the Court, “the
criminal context [was] much weightier because of our his-
toric[al] commitment to the rule of law . . . that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer.”  Here, however, the discovery
requests were not only about a party’s need for documents, but
also “the burden imposed by the discovery orders.”
Furthermore, this was not a routine discovery dispute: “The
Executive Branch, at its highest level, [was] seeking the aid of
the courts to protect its constitutional prerogatives.”  Unlike in
Nixon, it could not be said in this case that the “production of
confidential information would not disrupt the functioning of
the Executive Branch.”  In light of the overly broad requests,
the Court determined that Nixon could not provide “support
for the proposition that the Executive Branch ‘shall bear the
burden’ of invoking executive privilege with sufficient speci-
ficity and of making particularized objections.”  The Executive
Privilege “is an extraordinary assertion of power not to be
lightly invoked.”  Once it is asserted, “coequal branches of the
Government are set on a collision course.”  Therefore, it was
better that courts explore other avenues before “forcing the
Executive to invoke the privilege.”
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,47 the Court determined that an
alien taken into custody in a foreign country by foreign nation-
als and transferred to the United States, where he was immedi-
ately arrested and arraigned, could not (1) state claim under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the government or
(2) state a claim against one of the individuals involved in the
kidnapping under the Alien Torts Statute (ATS).  The Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) believed respondent was involved
in the torture and murder of one of its officers in Mexico.
When the DEA failed to obtain help from the Mexican govern-
ment in extraditing respondent for prosecution, the DEA
“approved of a plan to hire Mexican nationals to seize Alvarez
and bring him to the United States for trial.”  Respondent was
acquitted and subsequently brought an action against the gov-
ernment and several individuals involved in his kidnapping in
Mexico.  
The FTCA “was designed primarily to remove the sovereign
immunity of the United States from suits in tort and, with cer-
tain specific exceptions, to render the Government liable in
tort as a private individual.”  One exception was for “any claim
arising in a foreign country.”  The Court concluded that the
circumstances that took place in Mexico were the “kernel” of
the claim and, therefore, respondent’s claim arose in Mexico.
Thus, the claim fell within the exception for which the gov-
ernment had not waived immunity.  Furthermore, unlike the
Ninth Circuit, the Court found the “headquarters doctrine”
inapplicable.  For the doctrine to apply, a court must find that
the act or omission at the headquarters “was sufficiently close
to the ultimate injury, to make it reasonable to follow liability
back to the behavior at headquarters.”  The Court believed that
use of the doctrine would subject the government to liability
beyond that which was reasonable and, further, that it would
circumvent the Court’s understanding of proximate cause.  
The Court also determined that respondent did not state a
claim against one of the individuals involved in the kidnapping
based on the ATS, which provided that “[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States.”  The Court concluded that
“Congress intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a rela-
tively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of
nations,” i.e., safe conducts, infringement on rights of ambas-
sadors, and piracy.  The Court also believed judicial caution
should be exercised when expanding the traditional category
of actions that could be brought under the ATS and found that
respondent’s claim was not one of the circumstances that
would justify overcoming that caution.  The Court wrote, how-
ever, that “the door is still ajar” under the ATS for tort claims
based on more definite and accepted “customary law,” and
mentioned “prolonged arbitrary detention” as one possible
such claim.
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